Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment: An International Human Rights Issue by Rood, Victoria
Comment
SOVIET ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT: AN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE
The Soviet government has been known to engage in repres-
sion of individuals who oppose established governmental policies.'
While techniques of quieting opposition have varied, one method
has been increasingly utilized by the Soviets in recent years: forced
psychiatric hospitalization2 - often characterized by harsh treat-
ment, primitive conditions, indefinite confinement, and extensive
use of compulsory medication.3
Although misuse of psychiatry has occurred in other coun-
tries,4 Soviet abuse5 is unique in two important respects. First, the
number of political dissidents incarcerated through the use of psy-
1. Psychiatric Abuse of Political Prisoners in the Soviet Union: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Int'l Organizations of the House Comm. on Int' Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-
81, app. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings].
2. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR 31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
BLOCH].
3. Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union, Vol. 1I: Hearing
submitted to the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal SecurityAct and
Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
4. Robinson, World Congress Condemns Abuse, Psychiatric News, Oct. 7, 1977, at 1,
col. 2. Misuse of psychiatry has recently been reported in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and South
Africa. BoardAffirms Actions on Psychiatry Abuses, Psychiatric News, Oct. 1, 1976, at 1, col.
1. Opinions about psychiatric abuse in the United States differ. Dr. John Speigal stated that
there are no exact parallels between abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union and in the
United States, with the possible exceptions of Ezra Pound and General Walker, because the
issue is not only misuse, but misuse through incarceration. Dr. Speigal further stated that
role conflict could exist concerning prison psychiatrists or those working for the CIA and that
poor or ethnic peoples could be more frequently diagnosed as mentally ill, but that hospitali-
zation is not associated with political dissent. A further difference is that in the West there is
public exposure through thepress. Address by John Speigal, M.D., former President of the
American Psychiatric Association and Professor of Social Psychology at Brandeis University,
130th Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association at Toronto (May 2-6, 1977)
(emphasis added). For a discussion of possible cases in the United States, see T. SZASZ,
LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1968).
5. For the purposes of this comment, the terms "abuse" and "abuse of psychiatry"
mean the involuntary confinement in mental hospitals, and "treatment" means treatment by
drugs and other means of persons whose behavior would, in most societies, clearly be
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chiatry has increased rapidly in the past fifteen years.6 It is esti-
mated that 2,000 to 10,000 political dissidents in the Soviet Union-
are presently diagnosed as having some form of mental illness.7
Second, such incarceration is the product of a systematic national
policy.8
This comment will explore the vulnerability of Soviet psychia-
try to abuse and will examine the characteristics of forced Soviet
psychiatric treatment. Further, the Soviet contention that treat-
ment of its political dissidents is a matter of internal concern will be
appraised in light of the fundamental human right to be free from
arbitrary and forced medical treatment.9 Finally, a commission
will be proposed as a possible solution to the problem of Soviet
psychiatric abuse.
I. SOVIET PSYCHIATRIC THEORY
A. Inherent Vulnerability of Psychiatry to Abuse
To appreciate the use of psychiatry as a means of suppressing
dissent, it is necessary to examine the unique vulnerability of psy-
chiatry to abuse and then to demonstrate the connecting links be-
tween psychiatry and the Soviet State. Due to a persistent lack of
agreement among psychiatrists on criteria for defining mental ill-
ness, 10 psychiatry in any nation has an extraordinary potential for
deemed as arising from a sound mind and to have political or ethical - not psychiatric -
roots.
6. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 47. Dr. Norman Hirt, Associate Professor of Psychiatry at
the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, stated that conditions in the Soviet Union
had worsened since he testified in 1972 and that 7,000 to 8,000 Soviet dissidents were now
confined in psychiatric hospitals. Scott, Drug Lobotomies by Russ Charged, Los Angeles
Times, Mar. 2, 1975, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
7. A. SAKHAROV, MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD 31 (1975). See also AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE USSR: THEIR TREATMENT AND CONDI-
TIONS (1975).
8. Address by Paul Chodoff, M.D., 130th Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric
Association at Toronto (May 2-6, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Chodoff].
9. The Preamble of the United Nations Charter refers generally to the belief in the
existence of fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the individual. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights also reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights,
and articles 3 and 5 relate directly to forced medical treatment. See G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
10. See BLOCH, supra note 2, at 24-25.
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manipulation. " Unlike other 'branches of medicine, there are no
reliable objective tests to determine the presence of most mental
diseases.' 2 The result is that psychiatric diagnoses are based more
upon clinical observation than upon objective pathological
changes. "
Disagreement also exists within the profession regarding the
proper role of the psychiatrist."4 Some authorities believe that psy-
chiatry should be limited to reducing the pain and discomfort of the
patient and to help increase his capacity to adjust.'5 Other psychia-
trists feel that the profession should become involved in advancing
the social health of the nation as well as the mental health of the
individual and should assume a leading role in advancing social
goals.' 6 The lack of strict objective medical criteria and the disa-
greement within the profession regarding the proper role of psychi-
atry in society have afforded psychiatrists a great deal of flexibility
in diagnosing mental illness.
B. Soviet Psychiatric Theory and Diagnosis
1. Evolution of Soviet Psychiatric Theory. Conflict about the
proper role of the psychiatrist, as observed in the West, does not
exist in the Soviet Union, since Soviet psychiatrists are expected to
accept the psychiatric theory established by the state.' 7 Since the
1930's, Soviet psychiatry consistently has officially rejected basic
psychoanalytic theory. 8 Conventional Russian psychiatric theory
11. Chodoff, supra note 8.
12. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 25.
13. Id. at 24-25.
14. Id. at 23-24.
15. Busse, AP.4 's Role in Influencing the Evolution of a Health Care Delivery System, 126
AM. J. OF PSYCH. 739 (1969).
16. Waggoner, The PresidentialAddress." Cultural Dissonance and Psychiatry, 127 AM. J.
OF PSYCH. 1 (1970).
17. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 37.
18. A. Kiev, Introduction, in PSYCHIATRY IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD 12-13 (A. Kiev
ed. 1968). It appears that psychoanalytic theory has been rejected, because it focuses on
understanding the meaning of symptoms thus emphasizing the significance of unconscious
motivating forces of which symptoms are the result. In other words, psychoanalysis focuses
on unconscious thoughts as motivating forces over which man has little control. Psychoana-
lytic theory is therefore incompatible with social systems that set great store in rational plan-
ning for society and the individual. But see note 19 infra. When basic psychoanalytic theory
was rejected, Freud's works became generally inaccessible in the Soviet Union; translation of
them into Russian also ceased. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 40.
3
Rood: Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment: An International Human Ri
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
is based on a Pavlovian model' 9 combined with a Marxist view.2°
The resulting school of thought is that man's behavior is a conse-
quence of social and economic conditions prevailing in society.2'
This theory was officially adopted at a joint session of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences meeting in 1950, and the Academy resolved,
under party pressure, to further develop and apply Pavlovian the-
ory.22 The resultant Soviet psychiatric treatment is characteristi-
cally educative and directive.23
2. Interdependence of Psychiatry and the Soviet State. The
directive quality of official Soviet psychiatric theory is reinforced
by the state's control of clinical psychiatric practice.24 When the
federal structure of the Soviet Union was proclaimed in 1922, all
branches of the health service came, and have since remained,
under the control of the central government. 25  The Minister of
Health of each Soviet Republic is responsible to the federal minis-
try, which itself is answerable to the Supreme Soviet 26 of the Soviet
Union. Any change in theory requires approval of the federal min-
19. Pavlovian theory supports the view that people can be conditioned by specific stim-
uli - that is, an approximately controlled environment - to achieve social adaption. Thus,
symptoms of mental illness are viewed as conditioned reflexes developed through environ-
mental influences. Therefore, if noxious environmental factors are eliminated, the theory is
that undesirable phenomena will be extinguished.
Pavlovian theory thus supports the Soviet emphasis on the role of social factors; this
theory has received official support from the Soviet government, strengthening its central
role in Soviet psychiatry. Kiev, supra note 18, at 11-12. For a brief explanation of the
Pavlovian model, see Urban & Ford, Behavior Therapy, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1218-24 (A. Freedman & H. Kaplan eds. 1967).
20. Marxist social theory emphasizes the exalted position of work in man's activities
and stresses that man's behavior and actions are determined by the economic conditions in
which he finds himself. For a brief discussion of the Marxist political view as it relates to
psychiatric theory, see Kiev, supra note 18, at I 1-14.
21. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 40.
22. M. FIELD, SOVIET SOCIALIZED MEDICINE: AN INTRODUCTION 73 (1967).
23. Ziferstein, The Soviet Psychiatrist.- His Relationship to His Patients and to His Soci-
ety, 123 AM. J. OF PSYCH. 442 (1966). In educative and directive psychotherapy, the psychia-
trist takes a very active role. In addition to providing a supportive relationship, the
psychiatrist offers direct guidance on how problems should be solved and uses techniques of
education, advice, and exhortation. For a thorough examination of these characteristics as
they relate to the psychiatric treatment process, see Segal, The Theoretical Bases of Soviet
Psychotherapy, 29 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 503-23 (1975).
24. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 37.
25. Id.
26. The Supreme Soviet is the bicameral national legislature of the Soviet Union. As
the highest organ of state power, it has constitutional authority to make laws and adopt
constitutional amendments. The Supreme Soviet meets for brief sessions every six to eight
months and therefore cannot be considered a deliberative body in the Western sense. The
Supreme Soviet elects its own Presidium where policy decisions can be made. The Chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is the head of state. While the image of parliamen-
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istry. 27  Since all psychiatrists 28 are employed by the Ministry of
Health and are responsible to superiors, there is deliberate uni-
formity in psychiatric practice without options for alternative treat-
ment. As a part of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, the
Institute of Psychiatry29 is particularly instrumental in planning
psychiatric training and research programs and serves in an advi-
sory capacity to the Ministry of Health. This strategic position of
the Institute has further aided the development of a uniform psy-
chiatric policy.3"
Interdependence of psychiatry and the state is further linked
by a major emphasis on Marxist political ideology in psychiatric
training programs.3 As a part of the professional oath, the Soviet
physician swears that in all professional actions he will be "[gluided
by the principles of communist morality, ever to bear in mind the
...responsibility to the people and the Soviet State. 32
3. Recent Developments and Comparisons in Soviet Diagnoses
of Mental Illness. In addition to a directive application of one ba-
sic psychiatric theory, Soviet psychiatric diagnoses have undergone
a radical change in the past fifteen years. 33 With the rise in influ-
ence of the Moscow School of Psychiatry,34 the formerly narrow
diagnostic classification system has been replaced by a diagnostic
approach that includes many mild symptoms and common person-
ality types within its newly expanded clinical boundaries. 35 Under
tary democracy is thus created, no open opposition is permitted. In reality, the significance
of the Suprene Soviet is that it is a law-validating rather than a lawmaking body; decisions
made by the leadership are always formally adopted. Election to the Supreme Soviet is often
based upon services rendered to the Communist Party. J. PLANO & R. OLTON, THE INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS DICTIONARY 208 (1969).
27. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 37.
28. Those psychiatrists working in prisons and in the military are not under the direct
control of the Ministry of Health. Id.
29. The Institute of Psychiatry, located in Moscow, is the most prestigious and influen-
tial psychiatric training and research facility in the Soviet Union. Soviet Diagnostic Theories
Aid Dissident Suppression, Psychiatric News, June 17, 1977, at 45, col. I [hereinafter cited as
Soviet Diagnostic Theories].
30. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 37.
31. FIELD, supra note 22, at 33. Field notes that an average of 25%-35% of medical
training is devoted to political ideology.
32. The Physician's Oath of the Soviet Union, 81 SURVEY 114 (1971) (translation of Phy-
sician's Oath originally published in Meditsinskaya Gazeta, Apr. 20, 1971).
33. Address by Walter Reich, M.D., Lecturer in Psychiatry, Yale University, 130th An-
nual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association at Toronto (May 2-6, 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Reich].
34. See note 29 supra.
35. Soviet Diagnostic Theories, supra note 29. The dominant Soviet classification sys-
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the new diagnostic classification system presently used by the Mos-
cow School of Psychiatry, Soviet diagnoses have included the fol-
lowing statements as examples of schizophrenia: "A persistent
mania for truthseeking . . . . Meticulousness of thought and in-
sufficient insight with regard to the existing situation . . . . Con-
siders the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia an act of
aggression .... 36 Rationalizing or excessive fondness for ratio-
nalizing."37
One psychiatrist from the Moscow School stated that "[a] mild
schizophrenia does not presume a personality change apparent to
one's associates," and another declared that "[i]t is no secret that
schizophrenia sometimes occurs without any symptoms."38
While there is not unanimity in diagnostic criteria for serious
mental illness, the World Health Organization has recommended
the following symptoms as a guideline for determining serious
mental illness: "A pronounced disturbance in psychic activity, suf-
ficiently specific in character that it can always be recognized and
tem of schizophrenia identifies three basic types, divides each of those basic types into sub-
types, and then lists characteristics of each subtype.
The type of psychiatric illness attributed to many dissidents is the "sluggish" or "mild"
subtype of the "continuous" form of schizophrenia, characterized by steady deterioration.
The symptoms describing this alleged psychiatric illness include: self-consciousness; intro-
spectiveness; conflicts with parental and other authorities; and reformerism. Id.
Under this new classification system, some characteristic behaviors that are now said to
be consistent with schizophrenia, even in the absence of any psychotic symptoms, include:
novelty in behavior, such as wearing a beard; and the tendency to speak in ideological terms,
which can be seen as "suggestive of grandiose ideas or overestimation of self." Both are
"noted by Moscow School theoreticians as being typical of early paranoid tendencies." Fear
and suspiciousness are cited as characteristics, even though dissidents are known to be fol-
lowed, bugged, or harassed by the KGB. Fear of psychiatrists is included in this category.
Id.
If a dissident is diagnosed as schizophrenic and subsequently commits another dissident
act - even years after that diagnosis - he can be said to have committed that act as a result
of his chronic, genetically determined illness, and can thus be psychiatrically hospitalized
with the same diagnosis. Id.
The broadened diagnostic classification system is the standard by which all psychiatric
patients, not only dissidents, are diagnosed. In Moscow, where the broadened classification
system is used more extensively, six times as many cases of schizophrenia are now being
diagnosed as in Leningrad where the expanded system is not yet used as extensively. Kiev,
supra note 18, at 11. However, the incidence of schizophrenia does not vary greatly from
one geographical area to another. Id. at 14.
36. Abuse of Psychiatryfor Political Repression in the Soviet Union.- Hearings Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act of the Senate Comm
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
37. Id. at 8.
38. Id. at 26.
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identified with a typical set of symptoms, and sufficiently serious to
produce a loss in the ability to work. . . as to require. . . [a] spe-
cific legal or other social action." 9 To promote a uniform system
of diagnosis for the particular form of mental illness classified as
schizophrenia," the First International Diagnostic Seminar in
London recommended that the following six psychopathologic 4'
symptoms be used for criteria:
(1) Undeniable personality changes.
(2) Autism (i e. withdrawal, shutting oneself off from the
outside world, regression into a world of internal emotional
experiences).
(3) Disturbances in thinking processes.
(4) Emotional disturbances sufficiently serious to cause difficul-
ties in relations with other people.
(5) Disturbances in perception.
(6) Disturbances in behavior.42
When comparing Soviet diagnoses with the criteria recom-
mended by the International Diagnostic Seminar, it becomes ap-
parent that the Soviet diagnoses for schizophrenia extend to
patients who exhibit none of the above recommended symptoms.
Further, Western psychiatrists who have examined released dissi-
dents have noted the absence of mental illness and have generally
found the dissidents mentally sound. 3
It can thus be seen that by these mechanisms, Soviet psychiatry
is under state control and political theory is an integral part of the
medical training. Further, the expanded psychiatric diagnosic clas-
sification system has received state approval, and there is an offi-
cially prescribed method of psychiatric treatment. This
39. Id. at 25.
40. Schizophrenia is a particular form of psychotic mental disorder with many perplex-
ing symptoms. Presently there are no objective criteria for its diagnosis, though three general
primary symptoms can be distinguished: a disturbance of associations, affect, and activity.
Also stressed is the detachment from reality. Schizophrenia is classified as a prototype of
psychosis. For a basic explanation of symptoms and disease patterns, see H. Lehmann,
Schizophrenia IV- Clinical Features, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, 621-49
(A. Freedman & H. Kaplan eds. 1967).
41. Symptoms of diseases and abnormalities of the mind. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1833 (unabr. ed. 1971).
42. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 26.
43. Political Abuse of Psychiatry Condemned by WPA Assembly, Clinical Psychiatry
News, Oct. 1977, at 46, col. 2. The Royal College of Psychiatrists (United Kingdom) ex-
amined a number of released dissidents and found no evidence of psychiatric illness. Fur-
ther, psychiatrists from the United States and Canada also examined many released
dissidents and found an absence of mental disease. See generally BLOCH, supra note 2.
1979
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interdependence of state and psychiatry supports the hypothesis
that psychiatry can be used to further the ideology of the state.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY
,4. The Existence of the Soviet Political Prisoner
In view of the assertion that political dissidents are subject to
psychiatric imprisonment, it becomes necessary to define "political
prisoner." Two definitions have been generally accepted. The first
identifies political prisoners as those individuals persecuted rather
than prosecuted because of their political beliefs." The second de-
fines political prisoners as persons imprisoned because they consti-
tute a threat to the security of the government.45 The latter
definition seems to apply to most political dissidents incarcerated in
Soviet psychiatric hospitals.' Like other nations, the Soviet Union
officially claims to hold no political prisoners,47 but consistent evi-
dence received in the West indicates the existence of a Soviet policy
of organized incarceration of individuals who express political
views differing from state-approved policy.48 The evidence further
indicates that large numbers are confined to psychiatric facilities
primarily because of their political views rather than the presence
or severity of a psychiatric condition.49
B. Internment of the Soviet Political Dissident
Psychiatric confinement of persons who hold unacceptable po-
litical views is not a new phenomenon in the Soviet Union." There
is evidence that a systematic method of psychiatric internment of
44. Forsythe, Political Prisoners- The Law and Politics of Protection, 9 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 295, 297 (1976).
45. Id. at 300.
46. Brown, Silent Fall, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 65.
47. REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION TO EUROPE TO THE COMM'N ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT TO COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS
35 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as Comm. Print 1977]. The Soviets have declared
that they hold no political prisoners, only criminals. In 1959 Khruschev said that there were
no longer any political prisoners. Address by Vladimir Bukovsky, released Soviet dissident,
130th Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association at Toronto (May 2-6, 1977).
48. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 31. See 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 56-58 for documen-
tation of misuse of Soviet psychiatric facilities to systematically incarcerate political dissi-
dents. For nongovernmental documentation of the abuse, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
COMPULSORY CONFINEMENT IN PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS FOR POLITICAL REASONS IN THE
USSR: A DOSSIER OF CASES (1976).
49. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 7.
50. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 51.
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political dissenters began during the Stalin regime. 51 However, it
was not until 196652 that such abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet
Union came to international awareness.53 Since that time, reliable
documentation and an increasing number of reports have further
stimulated international concern.
54
1. Civil Commitment. Reports of psychiatric abuse in the
Soviet Union indicate that civil commitment has been increasingly
utilized as a means to facilitate psychiatric confinement. While the
procedure for civil commitment in the Soviet Union has been quite
clear,55 the upsurge in its utilization appears to be related to two
51. Id.
52. Western publication of WARD 7, a thinly disguised biography of the author V.Y.
Tarsis, is the story of a writer forcibly interned in a mental hospital for writing and distrubut-
ing anti-Soviet literature.
53. Id.
54. It was noted at the Executive Committee meeting of the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation (APA) that evidence of abuse had become more substantial since 1971. The APA
further stated that the Soviets had used their status in the World Psychiatric Association to
defend Soviet policies, and that the World Psychiatric Association's response to allegations
had been timid and inadequate. Board Affirms Actions on Psychiatry Abuses, supra note 4, at
6, col. 4.
The Sixth Congress of Psychiatry in Honolulu in August 1977, passed a resolution con-
demning the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes. Robinson, World Congress Con-
demns Abuse, Psychiatric News, Oct. 7, 1977, at 1, col. 2. In those discussions, previous to
passing the above mentioned resolution, the Soviet Union was specifically cited. Political
Abuse ofPsychiatry Condemned by WPA Assembly, Clinical Psychiatry News, Oct. 1977, at 1,
col. 4. Jack Weinberg, M.D., President of the American Psychiatric Association, stated:
I support the resolution condemning the abuse of psychiatry with a heavy
heart. I know that the vast number of Soviet psychiatrists are worthy colleagues
and practice ethically. We must all, nonetheless, be willing continually to search
out and condemn improper actions of even a few.
Robinson, World Congress Condemns Abuse, Psychiatric News, Oct. 7, 1977, at 8, col. 4.
The first reported action taken by the legal community appears to have taken place at
the Annual Meeting of The Association of American Law Schools in Atlanta in December
1977, where the deans of 72 United States law schools and more than 100 law professors
accused the Soviet government of denying legal rights to dissident Anatoly Shcharansky. In
a resolution sent to Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev, they asked that the imprisoned
dissident be allowed his legal rights and an open trial. Shcharansky Trial Near, Soviet Dissi-
dents Believe, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978, at 2, col. 2. The other action in which lawyers are
involved is the current formation of a committee of lawyers from the United States and
abroad to lobby on behalf of all political prisoners in the Soviet Union. This committee was
announced by Natalya Solzhenitsyn when commenting on the case of Aleksandr Ginzburg, a
presently imprisoned Soviet dissident. Gamarekjan, Soviet Dissidents' Wives Share a Crusade
in US, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1978, § E, at 7, col. 5.
55. Civil commitment can be effected by one psychiatrist or by a general doctor when a
psychiatrist is unavailable. The doctor must provide details of the medical and social reasons
for his judgment. He may be assisted by police when relatives or the ill person resists hospi-
talization.
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administrative directives. The first is Directive No. 04-14-(32) (In-
correct Behavior Directive) which adds "incorrect behavior"56 as a
criterion that can effect civil commitment. This directive further
states that some psychiatric illnesses may be accompanied by out-
wardly correct behavior, and that a provided list of symptoms sup-
porting immediate hospitalization is not - in itself - exhaustive,
but represents only the more commonly occurring socially danger-
ous states.57
In 1969, a second special decree was issued entitled "Measures
for Preventing Dangerous Behavior (Acts) on the Part of Mentally
Ill Persons."5" This decree grants the police, certain state officials,
and psychiatrists the discretion to interpret what is meant by "so-
cially dangerous behavior" and "mental illness."5 9 The signatory
ministers urged that this decree be applied "[t]o prevent dangerous
behavior on the part of mentally ill persons."' 60  The decree thus
introduced the new concept of socially dangerous tendencies - a
term lacking definition or explanation in the directive.
The expanded criteria presently utilized by the Soviets to effect
compulsory civil commitment may be compared with the more re-
strictive Western criteria. While Western standards for civil com-
mitment are not uniform, certain guidelines have been generally
accepted by many Western countries6' and provide that a person
can be forcibly confined:
Within 24 hours of commitment, the person must be examined by a panel of three psy-
chiatrists which decides the appropriateness of commitment and the need for further treat-
ment. A commission is then obligated to examine the patient monthly to determine the need
for continuing treatment. When the mental condition has improved, the commission ar-
ranges for the patient's release. Should errors in commitment be made, there is no remedy,
since Soviet law fails to provide for such a procedure. The patient is not allowed counsel and
has no right of judicial appeal at any point in his commitment. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, SPECIAL REPORT: THE FIRST U.S. MISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH TO THE
USSR (1969).
The Soviets have contended "[tihat judicial review is unnecessary because psychiatrists
have no motive to commit or detain a patient unjustifiably." 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at
77.
56. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 153. In cases of compulsory hospitalization, the health insti-
tutions involved have refused to show the directive to the person committed, to the institu-
tion, or to his or her relatives. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 24.
57. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 24.
58. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
60. Id. (emphasis added). This directive further states that if resistance is anticipated,
police may aid confinement.
61. Id. at 19.
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At the request of relatives on the basis of objective diagnosis and
in conformity with existing laws.
By court orders based on findings of a court appointed panel of
psychiatrists and then only if the person has committed a grave
and violent criminal offense or, by his behavior, presents a threat
to the life and property of others or himself. 2
In recent years there has been a Western movement to further
restrict compulsory institutionalization of the mentally ill.63 In the
United States, for example, a recent Supreme Court ruling limited
involuntary confinement to those mentally ill persons who present
an immediate danger to themselves or others or who are so inca-
pacitated that they can survive only in a mental hospital.64 Thus,
the expanded criteria of the Soviet Union which includes incorrect
behavior contrast sharply with immediate danger and survivability,
which are the criteria for compulsory civil commitment of the men-
tally ill in the United States.
2. Criminal Commitment. In addition to psychiatric con-
finement by civil means, the Soviets have arrested and charged
many political dissidents under the Soviet Criminal Code.65 Sec-
tions of this code most frequently applied to political dissidents
have been articles 70 and 190_1.66 Article 190-1 provides that a
criminal act is "[dlissemination of deliberate falsehoods discredit-
ing the Soviet political and social system, '67 and under article 70
the scope of conduct deemed criminal includes "[algitation or prop-
aganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening the
Soviet State. 68
62. Id.
63. MentalAttitude: Revised Rules Reduce Involuntary Confining of Psychiatric Patients,
Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1978, at 1, col. I [hereinafter cited as Revised Rules].
64. In the landmark case of O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme
Court found "dangerousness" and "survivability" to be the basic criteria to detain forcibly a
mentally ill person. Id.
65. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 102.
66. Id.
67. T. TAYLOR, COURTS OF TERROR 75 (1976). Article 190-0 further provides up to
three years imprisonment for "systematic circulation in an oral form of fabrications known
to be false which defame the Soviet State and social system, and likewise, the preparation or
circulation in written, printed, or any other form of works of such content." Id.
68. Id. at 72. Article 70 defines as criminal, the circulation "of slanderous fabrications
which defame the Soviet State and social system, or the circulation or preparation or keeping
. . . of literature of such content." Id. For such activities, article 70 provides for up to seven
years imprisonment and up to five years of internal exile. Id. Further, no one charged under
article 70 has been adjudged innocent. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
11
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After arrest under articles 190-1 or 70 of the Soviet Criminal
Code, the court of justice has the sole authority to determine
whether the detainee's actions were due to "insanity. ' 69 Once a
person is adjudged insane, he is deemed unaccountable for his ac-
tions; a determination of guilt or innocence is avoided.70
The unique effect created by the expanded psychiatric diag-
nostic system, the civil administrative directives; and certain articles
of the criminal code has been to place Soviet citizens under forced
psychiatric treatment on the basis of activities that would not justify
such a result in Western nations. Publicist activities,7 participation
in civil rights activities,72 and the writing of allegedly subversive
songs73 have led to psychiatric commitment of individuals. Others
EUROPE, 95TH CONG., IST SESs., REPORT TO HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS ON IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONF. ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION: FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS Two YEARS AFTER HELSINKI 20 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 REPORT].
69. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 7.
70. Id. at 8.
7 1. Zaur s Medvedev, a geneticist, writer, and civil rights activist was forcibly removed
to a psychiatric hospital, diagnosed as a "sluggish schizophrenic," and reported that he was
told, "If you continue your publicist activities, then you will inevitably end up back here with
us." Z. MEDVEDEV & R. MEDVEDEV, A QUESTION OF MADNESS 20 (1971).
Vladimir Bukovsky, a biology student and civil rights activist who spent II of his 34
years in prisons and camps in the Soviet Union, was diagnosed in 1972 as having a simple
form of schizophrenia and sentenced to seven years confinement in a mental institution after
he publicized in an American television interview the abuse of mental institutions for the
purpose of political repression. Bukovsky had told correspondents of the Associated Press
and of the Columbia Broadcasting System what he had seen in prisons, camps, and psychiat-
ric hospitals. Implementation of the HelsinkiAccords, Vol. 1- Hearings Before the Comm'n. on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977
Hearings].
The French Communist Party pressured the Soviets to reconsider the 12-year sentence
given to Bukovsky. In reply, the Deputy Justice Minister gave a newspaper interview
stressing that Bukovsky was guilty of seeking to overthrow the Soviet regime by sending an
account of conditions of political prisoners in Soviet mental hospitals to the West for publi-
cation. Comm. Print 1977, supra note 47, at 34-35. Bukovsky was released before his sen-
tence expired and permitted to leave the Soviet Union. President Carter has since received
Bukovsky at the White House. Brown, Silent Fall, N. Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1977, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 63. For a detailed discussion of Bukovsky's internment, release, and subsequent
examination by Western psychiatrists, see E. F. Torrey, The Serbsky Treatment, PSYCHOL-
OGY TODAY, June 1977, at 38.
72. Natalya Gorbanevskaya, a civil rights activist, was arrested for demonstrating
against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. She spent one year in psychiatric detention
after being diagnosed as having a form of schizophrenia "having no symptoms." 1976 Hear-
ings, supra note I, at 28.
73. Composer Peter Starchik spent two months in an insane asylum outside Moscow
apparently because he wrote and sang subversive songs for groups of friends. He was diag-
nosed as "socially dangerous." 1976 Hearings, supra note 1, at 29.
Vol. 9
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have been committed, because they applied for a visa to attend a
scientific conference,74 applied to emigrate,75 or went to Commu-
nist Party Central Committee officials with a complaint. 76 During
the psychiatric detention of one dissident, the mother was told that
"[h]e is held here not because he is ill, but because of his behav-
ior.
' 77
In close temporal relationship with the establishment of these
civil and criminal psychiatric commitment procedures, a sharp in-
crease in the number of Soviet psychiatric facilities has been noted.
In the late 1950's there were three special psychiatric hospitals in
the Soviet Union; there are now fifteen.7' The number of beds for
patients with mental and nervous diseases has increased between
1962 and 1974 from 222,600 to 390,00071 - an increase of seventy-
five percent. Conversely, during this same period, Western nations
have developed newer psychiatric techniques and have placed em-
phasis on the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill. As a result
there has been a marked decrease in the number of psychiatric in-
patients."
Psychiatric commitment has been facilitated in several unique
ways. Some high officials in Moscow have an ambulance on per-
manent duty or are in direct contact with such a service and are
thus prepared to respond immediately to mentally ill persons who
74. Dr. Yesenin-Volpin, a Soviet mathematician, was detained in a Soviet mental hospi-
tal after he applied to the American Embassy for a visa to visit the United States after having
been invited to attend a scientific conference at the University of Buffalo. He was diagnosed
as having a simple form of schizophrenia. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 12. Dr. Volpin's
last confinement resulted in a petition to free him, signed by 95 Soviet scientists and numer-
ous protests from abroad. He has stated that this action by colleagues on his behalf was
partially responsible for his release. Many scientists who signed the petition were subse-
quently subjected to various forms of administrative sanctions. Some were dismissed, others
demoted, and all were denied the right to travel abroad. Id. at 11.
75. The doctor told one man that "[n]ormal people don't apply to emigrate." 1976
Hearings, supra note 1, at 30.
76. When Nadezhda Gaidar went to Moscow from her home in Kiev to make the com-
plaint, she was forcibly hospitalized under the care of a psychiatrist who was told that "[s]he
is suffering from nervous exhaustion due to her search for justice." COMMISSION ON SECUR-
ITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, REPORTS OF HELSINKI ACCORD-MONITORS IN THE SO-
VIET UNION: DOCUMENTS OF THE PUBLIC GROUPS TO PROMOTE OBSERVANCE OF THE
HELSINKI AGREEMENTS IN THE USSR, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 28-29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
HELSINKI MONITORS].
77. 1976 Hearings, supra note 1, at 30.
78. 1977 Hearings, supra note 71, at 26. See also note 89 infra. The special psychiatric
hospitals are for the criminally insane and not the generally mentally ill.
79. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 47.
80. Revised Rules, supra note 63.
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come to their reception rooms.8' An accused can be sentenced to a
psychiatric hospital in an exparte proceeding.82 The Soviet Secret
Police (KGB) 3 developed their own psychiatric service which has
led to diagnoses based on the content of a person's writings even
when the writings show no conventional sign of delusional mate-
rial.84 This is contrary to generally accepted medical practice.
Psychiatric commitment has been further simplified, since a
new centralized system of psychiatric record keeping has been im-
plemented. 6 Under the new system, copies of dissidents' psychiat-
ric records are kept locally and can quickly be made available to
officials. 87 Having viewed the means by which individuals are dia-
gnosed and committed, it is appropriate to consider some aspects of
treatment the patient is compelled to undergo.
3. Treatment. Once diagnosed insane, the patient is sent to
a psychiatric hospital. Involuntary treatment takes place in either
regular psychiatric hospitals, or special psychiatric hospitals. 8 The
latter are under police supervision, staffed by police guards, and are
used only for compulsorily committed patients.8 9 While psychotics
and the criminally insane are committed there, so are men and wo-
men whose "abnormalities" stem more from unorthodox views and
criticism of authorities than from aberrant behavior caused by
psychic dysfunction.90
In the special psychiatric hospitals particularly, treatment of
the political dissident may include deprivations and maltreat-
ment.9 Visits from closest family members are frequently denied
81. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 27 1.
82. Id. at 103.
83. The initials KGB stand for Komitet Gossudarrstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Committee
of State Security or Soviet Secret Police). R. DESOLA, ABBREVIATIONS DICTIONARY 151
(1967).
84. 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 27.
85. Id. at 26-27.
86. Kiselev, Centralized System for Collection and Analysis of Data on Patients in the
USSR., 128 AM. J. PSYCH. 1019 (1972).
87. Id. Copies are also kept in all Union Health Agencies and in the bureaus of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (the police agency).
88. B. Segal, Involuntary Hospitalization in the U.S.S.R., in PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOL-
OGY IN THE U.S.S.R. 270 (S. Corson ed. 1976).
89. Id.
90. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 7.
91. Dr. Jules Masserman, 130th Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion at Toronto, (May 2-6, 1977). See also 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 9.
Vol. 9
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or made difficult.92 Permitted visits are usually monitored by a
guard and no written matter may be transmitted by the patient.93
Communication is restricted to the Russian language.94 Political
prisoners have been kept in isolation to prevent interaction with
each other and with nurses. 95 Many male nurses who staff these
hospitals are criminals serving out their sentences.96 Beatings of
patients are not uncommon,97 and there have been increasing re-
ports of torture by hunger.98
Another controversial aspect of the Soviet psychiatric program
is the application of certain medications in treatment.99 Some
drugs used by the Soviets are not administered in the, West because
of their harmful effects.' °° One such preparation is aminazine,
t01
which is said to dull memory and blunt emotions. Reports of de-
creased motivation when under the effect of this drug have also
been received.'02 As punishment, sulfazine103 is sometimes admin-
istered to patients who have refused to see the doctor or submit to
treatment.' n The effects of this drug include fever, joint inflamma-
tion, and excruciating pain when one attempts to move. 05
Further, during the course of hospitalization, a psychiatric
commission is to examine the patient periodically'016 for progress.
92. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 198.
93. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 7.
94. Id.
95. HELSINKI MONITORS, supra note 76, at 17.
96. 1976 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5.
97. Segal, supra note 88, at 271.
98. 1977 REPORT, supra note 68, at 24. Also, since November 1972, the right to send
food parcels to prisoners has ended. Id.
99. For a brief discussion of drug use, see 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 27-29.
100. Id. at 29.
101. Id. at 27. This medication and others to be mentioned are members of a group of
anti-psychotic, calming medications - formerly called major tranquilizers - related to, but
perhaps more toxic than, similar medications used frequently in the West. These drugs re-
verse some psychotic symptoms such as hyperactivity, hostility, tension, poor self-care, hallu-
cinations, and delusions. Unlike sedatives such as Demerol and the barbiturates which slow
the higher, more specialized areas of the brain thereby causing drowsiness, these anti-
psychotic agents affect the more basic, primitive parts of the brain. Emotions, feelings, and
social concerns may be dulled, while thinking and awareness of these states remain intact.
Those who have experienced these medications generally find them highly unpleasant. See
generally R. BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 13-56 (1977).
102. 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 27.
103. BALDESSARINI, supra note 101.
104. Segal, supra note 88, at 271.
105. 1977 Hearings, supra note 71, at 27.
106. 1972 Hearings, supra note 36, at 7.
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However, progress is often interpreted to mean that the patient is
prepared to recant on his political views, is willing to recognize the
correctness of his confinement, and is ready to conform. 0 7 If the
patient refuses to make such statements for moral reasons, he may
be confined indefinitely.
0 8
While the Soviet government has consistently denied Western
allegations that psychiatry is misused in the Soviet Union, many
reports of abuse have been received and authenticated in the
West.' 9 Further, Western reports of Soviet psychiatric abuse have
not been challenged by Soviet psychiatric authorities." 0
Amnesty International, which in November 1975 had reported
a decline of political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, re-
vised its view in April 1977, finding that the practice "[i]s continu-
ing at a disturbing rate." ''  The United States Commission to
monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accord stated that they lack-
ed evidence of whether the practice of psychiatric internment had
risen or declined, but felt that such judgment was unnecessary, be-
cause the record clearly showed that psychiatric detention and
forced treatment have been a continuing form of reprisal." 2 The
107. Id.
108. Id. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is a Congressional
Commission created and authorized to monitor the compliance of the signatories with the
articles of the Final Act of the Helsinki Accord - particularly the provisions relating to
cooperation in the humanitarian fields. It found that political offenses are punished more
harshly in the Soviet Union than are other criminal actions. This harshness was effected not
necessarily by longer prison terms, but by more restrictive conditions in and after confine-
ment. 1977 REPORT, supra note 68, at 24. It has been found that after release there can be a
continuing restriction on civil rights. Residence in major cities can be barred to such persons
even if the cities were their former homes. Terms of probation require frequent appearances
at militia stations, curfews are imposed, and former prisoners can be barred from such public
places as restaurants and caf6s. Id. at 25.
109. See authorities cited at note 48 supra. See also BLOCH, supra note 2. For nongov-
ernmental reporting, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE
U.S.S.R.: THEIR TREATMENT AND CONDITIONS (1975).
110. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 80.
111. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COMPULSORY CONFINEMENT IN PSYCHIATRIC HosPI-
TALS FOR POLITICAL REASONS IN THE U.S.S.R.: A DOSSIER OF CASES 1 (1977).
112. Id. An example cited was the organized punitive campaign of 1976 and 1977
against Soviet citizens who sought to promote respect for the Helsinki Accord. The Soviet
government declared that the citizen group which organized itself to monitor the Accord was
an anti-constitutional organization engaged in provocation, and monitoring was declared a
crime. Official reaction to the group was oppressive and included surveillance, mail and
telephone interception, interrogations, searches, physical threats, and arrests. 1977 REPORT,
supra note 68, at 23.
The Soviets have thus far imprisoned 11 members of the original citizen's group
founded to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accord. Eleven United States Sen-
Vol. 9
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officially sanctioned forced psychiatric imprisonment of Soviet po-
litical dissidents will now be examined in light of presently recog-
nized international standards.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
.4. Intervention Doctrine
The Soviets claim that psychiatric treatment of their nationals
is a purely domestic matter; they further -contend that any at-
tempted intervention ! 3 would violate Soviet sovereignty.'14
Whether human rights is an issue solely of domestic concern has
been left unsettled by international law." 5 While the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention 16 has never received unanimous sup-
port, it did gain solid acceptance beginning in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury." 7 The theory of humanitarian intervention states that when a
ators have joined Norwegian and Danish representatives in nominating the group for the
1978 Nobel Peace Prize. Soviet Dissidents' Wives Share a Crusade in the U.S., N. Y. Times,
supra note 54, at 48, col. 5.
113. For the purpose of this comment, intervention is defined as "dictatorial interference
by a state (or group of states) in the affairs of another state for the purpose of maintaining or
altering the actual conditions of things." I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (8th ed.
H. Lauterpacht 1955). For purposes of this comment, dictatorial interference does not in-
clude the threat of armed force.
114. Soviet science of international law states unequivocally that the legal position of
individuals is determined by national rather than international law. N. LEECH, C. OLIVER &
J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 617 (1973), cit-
ing MOVCHAN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM IN PRESENTDAY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1969
CONTEMP. INT'L L. 233, 239 (Moscow).
115. OPPENHEIM, supra note 113, at 305. Intervention, being a violation of another
state's independence, was recognized as a principle contrary to international law. J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 402 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963). Accord, Winfield, The
History ofIntervention in Imernational Law, 3 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 130, 139 (1922-1923) (non-
intervention is the rule, intervention is the exception). Some jurists have found that interven-
tion to prevent a state from committing atrocities against its subjects is recognized by
international law. BRIERLY, supra at 403. And while the principle of equal sovereignty and
the duty of nonintervention have been cornerstones of international relations, abuse of a
generally recognized right can lead to removal of a state's immunity. I. C. HYDE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 118 (1922).
116. See note 115 supra.
117. Lillich, Forcible Se/f-Hep by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325,
332 (1967). Oppenheim states that there is a
[slubstantial body of opinion and practice in support of the view that there are
limits to (the) discretion (of states in the treatment of their own nationals) and that
when a state renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecutions of its nation-
als in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the
conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissi-
ble.
17
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nation uses its sovereignty to deprive its nationals of fundamental
human rights, it is presumed to act in direct conflict with generally
recognized principles of humanity." 8 Such abuse can lead to re-
moval of that state's sovereign immunity in order to protect the in-
dividual citizens so deprived." 9  Thus, international law has
accepted the theory that a state's abuse of its nationals gives other
states the right to intervene.
As applied to the Soviet Union, the theory of humanitarian
intervention was strengthened when the Soviets signed the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2 ° (Helsinki Accord or
Accord). The Soviets initially proposed the Helsinki Accord as a
means of securing Western recognition of Soviet territories ac-
quired as a result of World War II. However, the Accord also in-
cludes important human rights provisions.
While the Helsinki Accord is morally compelling,' 2' legal sig-
nificance can be determined by examining specific human rights
OPPENHEIM, supra note 113, at 312.
Abuse can lead to removal of a state's immunity in order to protect the individual. As
E. Borchard states:
[When] a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own
citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the
family of nations are authorized by international law to intervene on grounds of
humanity.
E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 14 (1916). And Sir H.
Shawcross, at the Nuremberg trials: "The right of humanitarian intervention in the name of
the rights of man trampled upon by the state in a manner offensive to the feeling of human-
ity, has been recognized long ago as an integral part of the Law of Nations." H. Shawcross,
Exposi Introductif au Proci's de Nuremberg, cited in Aroneanu, L 'Intervention d'Humanit el
/a Diclaration Universelle des Droits de r'Homme, 33 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, DE
SCIENCE DIPLOMATIQUE ET POLITIQUE 127 (1955). And finally: "It is now so clearly estab-
lished that only [the] limits [of international intervention] and not its existence is subject to
debate." INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BY GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERIM REPORT OF THE SUB-COM-
MITTEE, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS I I (The Hague 1970).
118. DeSchutter, Humanitarian Intervention." .4 United Nations Task, 2 CALIF. W. INT'L
L.J. 27 (1972).
119. See note 117 supra.
120. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN POLICY SERIES No. 8826, FINAL ACT, CONFER-
ENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HELSINKI (1975) [hereinafter cited as the
HELSINKI ACCORD].
121. The Helsinki Accord itself does not have the force of a treaty imposing obligations
upon the signatories. It was clear from the beginning that the Helsinki Accord would be
morally compelling but not legally binding. This was established by the concluding clause
and the letter which authorized its transmission to the United Nations. The first expressed
the "high political significance" the signatories attach to the Helsinki Accord. The second
noted that the Helsinki Accord was not eligible for registration with the United Nations as it
would be was it a treaty. 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 349 (1975).
Vol. 9
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provisions. The basic goals of the human rights provisions are to
hold signatories responsible for respecting the beliefs of the individ-
ual and to promote an internal standard of conduct toward citizens
that reflects international good faith.'22 This goal is set forth in
article VII, paragraph 2, which states:
[The signatories] will promote and encourage the effective exer-
cise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights
and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person and are essential for his free and full develop-
ment. '
23
This goal is further developed in paragraph 8, which provides that:
[11n the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the
participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill
their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and
agreements in this field, including inter alia the International
Covenant on Human Rights by which they may be bound.
1 24
Reference in the Helsinki Accord 25 to the United Nations
Charter (Charter), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
126
(Universal Declaration), and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights 27 (International Covenant) strengthens the
binding effect of the human rights provisions of the Accord, since
the Charter, the Universal Declaration, and the International Cove-
nant have all acquired the force of international law.
28
Notwithstanding the broad language of the Charter, Lauter-
pacht states that by satisfying the tests of time and uniform prac-
tice, it has become a part of customary international law.'29
Having met the same tests, the transition into international law also
122. Comm. Print 1977, supra note 47, at 32.
123. HELSINKI ACCORD, supra note 120, at 80.
124. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
125. HELSINKI ACCORD, supra note 120.
126. G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The Soviet Union ratified the Univer-
sal Declaration when it voted in favor of the 1963 Declaration on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2904 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963), which
declared that each state would "fully and faithfully observe the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights." Id. art. 11.
127. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
This was adopted on December 16, 1966 and ratified by the Soviet Union on October 16,
1973. It entered into force March 23, 1976 after the thirty-fifth state ratified it.
128. See also notes 130-132 infra.
129. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 153 (1950).
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applies to the Universal Declaration. 130 The International Cove-
nant became part of international law in 1966 when it was ratified
by the thirty-fifth state.' 3 ' The proposition that the Soviets are
bound by these documents is strengthened further, because the So-
viet Union ratified the Universal Declaration 132 and is a signatory
to the International Covenant. 1
33
In the Helsinki Accord, the Soviets attempted to mitigate the
binding effect of the Universal Declaration by including reference
to the International Covenant, the language of which can be con-
strued to limit human rights by recognizing that they may conflict
with domestic law "[n]ecessary to protect public safety, order,
health or morals."' 34 In the Helsinki Accord, however, reference to
the International Covenant is placed in a secondary position to the
Declaration. Thus, the broad language of the Universal Declara-
tion takes legal precedence over the more restrictive terms of the
Covenant. 
3 5
Therefore, it may be concluded that the Charter and the Uni-
versal Declaration initially make the subject of civil liberties a mat-
ter of international concern. 36 Furthermore, by including human
rights provisions and by making specific reference to certain inter-
national agreements which have attained the force of international
law, the Helsinki Accord established each state's right to be con-
cerned with the manner in which other states demonstrate their re-
spect for human rights.
137
Thus, human rights are now a legitimate agenda item in East-
West relations. ' 38 The fact that the fundamental human rights con-
tained in the Accord are not to be construed as "[p]rivileges ex-
tended by a government when it suits its national policy"' 139 was
forcefully reiterated at the 1977 Conference in Belgrade called to
review progress in implementation of the Helsinki Accord. In
130. L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTAHL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
519 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SOHN].
131. E. HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL ACTION 127 (1970).
132. See note 126 supra.
133. See note 127 supra.
134. Comm. Print 1977, supra note 47, at 33-34.
135. Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Liliut?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 268
(1976).
136. SOHN, supra note 130, at 519.
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pressing for Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of
the Accord, the non-Soviet bloc delegates unequivocally asserted
that the issue was international in scope. This was succinctly stated
by the Swedish delegate: "We cannot possibly regard this an inter-
ference in the affairs of other nations. The Final Act of Helsinki
gives us good grounds for holding this view."' 140 The French dele-
gate continued: "The principle of nonintervention must certainly
not serve as a pretext for avoiding carrying out the commitments in
the Helsinki Final Act."'
141
Thus, it has been demonstrated that by ratifying the Universal
Declaration, the Soviet Union assumed an obligation to ensure its
citizens their fundamental human rights. When the Soviets signed
the Helsinki Accord, which included both human rights provisions
and a reiteration of a state's responsibilities under existing interna-
tional legal documents, they firmly established human rights in the
Soviet Union as an issue of legitimate international concern. Thus,
international intervention is legally permissible.
The problem of protecting citizens from psychiatric abuse
which exceeds limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act
with reason and justice cannot be redressed by resort to local reme-
dies, since such abuses are, by their very nature, a part of the estab-
lished order.142  A successful resolution of the problem of
psychiatric abuse requires that protection be institutionalized and
codified. The following proposed council is intended as a step to-
ward the ultimate goal of codifying the right to be free from psychi-
atric and medical abuse.
IV. PROPOSAL
A council to investigate allegations of psychiatric abuse
(Council) could be organized as a division of an existing United
Nations organization - the Commission on Human Rights. As
part of an existing body, the Council could be established under
articles 7 and 22 of the United Nations Charter 143 and would have
the duty of reporting directly to the General Assembly.
140. Rights Can Be Discussed with Russ, L.A. Times, Oct. 8, 1977, § I, at 14, col. 1.
141. Id.
142. M. MOSKOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 124 (1974).
143. Article 7, paragraph 2 states: "Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary
may be established in accordance with the present Charter."
Article 22 states: "The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it
deems necessary for the performance of its functions."
21
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The Council's first task would be to draw up its rules of proce-
dure. Once adopted, these guidelines would be transmitted to
member states of the United Nations, thus serving the purposes of
publicizing the Council and facilitating its utilization. The second
procedural task would be for the Council to draft a Fundamental
Code of Rights for the Mentally Ill (Code). The Code would enu-
merate fundamental rights which would be applicable to all coun-
tries.
The function of the Council would be: (1) To receive com-
plaints ofpsychia/ric and medical abuse. The Council would receive
complaints from member states of the United Nations, other na-
tions, or nongovernmental organizations whose function is the pro-
motion of civil and political rights as recognized by the United
Nations."' (2) To investigate complaints. In its investigation pro-
cedure, 14 5 the Council would gather, collate, and evaluate evi-
dence.1 46  Sources of evidence available to the Council would
include requests for governmental reports.'4 7 This method of ob-
taining information has often proven reliable."' However, because
some governments advocate policies of secrecy or promote self-in-
terest, relying exclusively on this method to obtain information has
proven insufficient.' 49 Therefore, the Council might also request
reports from nongovernmental human rights organizations. This
method of securing evidence has proven so successful that it has
become an officially sanctioned means of reporting in the United
Nations.' 50 Another source of evidence would be reports from al-
144. A list of nongovernmental organizations in a consultative status appears in [19661
U.N.Y.B. 510-15.
145. Investigation as a means of the United Nations to protect individuals from govern-
ment oppression came into prominent use in the United Nations in 1967 when the Human
Rights Commission established an Ad Hoc Group of Experts to investigate conditions of
prisoners and detainees in South Africa. See 42 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6) 77, U.N. Doc.
E/4322-E/CN.4/940 (1967).
146. Gathering, collating, and evaluating evidence were all mentioned in a 1967 United
Nations resolution as being useful in combating large-scale violations of human rights. See
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/930-E/CN.4/Sub. 2/274 (1967).
147. Certain human rights agreements, one of which is the International Covenant, call
for government reporting, supra note 127.
148. See Carey, Proceduresfor International Protection of Human Rights, 53 IOWA L.
REV. 291, 311 (1967).
149. This is best illustrated by South Africa's incomplete responses to questionnaires.
See U.N. Doc. E/4340-E/CN.4/942 & Corr. I & Add.1 (1967); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.22/5
(1967).
150. See note 144 supra.
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leged victims or persons close to them.' 5 ' Such evidence is ob-
tained either by written reports 52 or by hearings. 53 On the basis of
all evidence received and evaluated, the Council would determine
the validity of the complaint. (3) To make a determination. If, at
the conclusion of the investigation, the Council finds that a viola-
tion of human rights has occurred through the abuse of psychiatry,
a formal complaint would be filed with the offending state. The
Council would then establish a time period during which the of-
fending state would be asked to correct the alleged abuse. At any
time during the period allotted for correction of the abuse, if the
Council or the offending state feel that continued dialogue would
aid resolution of the problem, either could request that an ongoing
communications program be established. Such a program would
be instituted at the discretion of the Council. The program would
be noncompulsory and function generally through private talks, re-
serving the use of publicity.'54 (4) Enforcement. If the offending
state does not correct the alleged abuse within the specified time,
the Council would organize and wage a highly visible, sustained
publicity campaign.'55 By publicizing facts and findings and chal-
lenging the offending state, the Council would inform other govern-
ments and the public of the abuse. The power of publicity to aid
the oppressed is a practice that has been fervently urged in past
United Nations proceedings.'56 The Secretary-General stated that
"[a] purposeful and universal program of public information is, in
fact, a program of implementation - an essential counterpart of
the substantive activities of the Organization."'' 57  There is strong
151. In 1965, the United Nations took a historic step by writing a provision into the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination al-
lowing individuals' complaints against their own governments to be considered. See 660
U.N.T.S. 212 (1966), art. XIV [hereinafter cited as 1966 Convention on Discrimination].
152. While written reports from individuals have been utilized by the United Nations,
such has been the case only erratically. Carey, The United Nations' Double Standard on
Human Rights Complaints, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 792 (1966).
153. For a background of United Nations utilization of hearings, see U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/419 (1950).
154. Private talks or negotiations were specifically provided for in the 1966 Convention
on Discrimination, supra note 153, and were also called for on the part of the Human Rights
Committee provided for in the 1966 International Covenant Rights, supra note 127.
155. The Human Rights Commission called on member states of the United Nations to
give wide publicity to the testimony of political prisoners and victims of South Africa, and
there was testimony that publicity could alleviate such conditions. See 42 U.N. ESCOR,
Supp. (No. 6) 77, U.N. Doc. E/4322-E/CN.4/940 (1967).
156. J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 154 (1970).
157. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. IA) 2, U.N. Doc. A/6301/Add.l (1966).
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authority in support of the view that only unified public opinion
can confront specific cases of human rights violations and provide a
general moral condemnation that will force governments to make
the necessary change.' 58
In sum, such a Council could be presently established by the
United Nations. Through gathering, collating, and evaluating evi-
dence, the Council could make an informed determination on the
existence of alleged psychiatric abuse. If psychiatric abuse were de-
termined, the Council would provide a specified time for correc-
tion. A government's refusal to restore the right would result in the
Council's publication of the abuse thereby informing the public.
The rationale is that international exposure, informed public opin-
ion, and public solidarity can alleviate such conditions. 59 Interna-
tional solidarity can be a powerful force in compelling compliance
and unified public opinion is a cornerstone of customary interna-
tional law. The present goal is to inform and unite so that the re-
straining influence of publicity with no criminal overtones can
emerge as a significant method of protecting individuals from psy-
chiatric abuse. The ultimate aim of codification into positive inter-
national law can then be realized.
V. CONCLUSION
Reviewing charges that political dissidents are imprisoned in
the Soviet Union through the abuse of psychiatry compels ac-
knowledgment that such psychiatric commitment frequently occurs
because of political beliefs and expression and not because of
mental aberration or illness. The foregoing analysis of interna-
tional law examined the Soviet contention that such treatment is an
internal matter. The subsequent finding is that while such treat-
ment is an internal practice, it becomes a legitimate issue of inter-
national concern in two instances: when a sovereign treats its
nationals in such a way that exceeds reason and justice; and when
the sovereign violates international commitments that ensure pro-
tection of fundamental human rights. To protect ultimately the cit-
izen from psychiatric abuse, international intervention must be
codified. However, until international solidarity merges with na-
tional interests so that codification can be institutionalized, this
comment proposes the formation of a Council that can be inte-
158. Carey, supra note 148, at 318.
159. See note 156 supra.
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grated into the existing international legal structure. Such a Coun-
cil would receive and evaluate allegations of psychiatric abuse.
Provided the Council finds evidence of psychiatric abuse, and pro-
vided that an offending state refuses to restore the right, the Coun-
cil would implement a policy of publication - the theory being
that informed public opinion can emerge as a significant method of
protecting individuals from psychiatric abuse. A Council that
would provide a sound framework for skillful implementation of
such a program would hasten realization of the ultimate goal, codi-
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